원자력 사건 조사분석에서 위반 오류의 비난성에 대한 기초연구 A Preliminary Study on the Culpability of Violation Errors in Nuclear Events and their Investigations

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1. Background and Introduction

- 인적오류의 재부각 : 후쿠시마 => 중대사고 => HOF
- 인적오류 범위의 확대 : **인적오류 검증의 한계 = 위반 누락**
 - ◆ 설계 검증 V&V에서 인적오류 범위
 - ◆ PSA/ HRA에서 고려되는 인적오류의 범위
 - ◆ PSR, stress Test에서 인적오류의 범위
 - ◆ 사고고장 사건의 조사분석에서 빈번한 논란
- 원자력 시스템의 특성 관련 (NPP 기준) unique and hard-to-overcome . (2015, 2016 Lee)
 - > large and complex system into a social disaster
 - > non-injury system loss with low self-motives
 - ➤ latent hazards by multiple barriers and DID
 - > rare data for learning from errors
 - > tightly-coupled but delayed risk
 - > out-of-loop by the partial automation/integration
- 위반(violation)의 중요성 (2015/2019 이용희) => more vulnerable & quarrelsome issue
 - ➤ 예외성(exceptionality) : 설계/예상된 범위 밖의 조치
 - ▶ 책임성(responsibility) : 관련자/이해관계자 cf. Sharp-End/Organized Irresponsibility Issue
 - ➤ 파급성(propagatory) : 안전 기능의 무력화 파급 + 사후 논란의 파급성 cf. 등급평가 문제

2. Violation as a Safety Culture or HF?

- > Human Error including Violations?
- > Safety Culture Issue => Attribution Error!!! 답정너 현상
 - 당연성 Triviality ; self-evident factor to all Events negative or positive
 - 종결조건: Convenient Termination Criteria to Event Investigations
 - 임의성 : Artificiality to Countermeasures

Prior Studies

- ➤ Violations in Safety Culture Management (2015 이용희, 2015 박기찬)
- ➤ Types of Violations (2016/2019 이용희)
 - routine/permitted violation,
 - > mannerism, negligence, avoidance, by-standing...
 - Optimized and convenience violation...
 - temporal and exceptional violation...
 - test violation, curiosity violation, learning violation, asked/induced violations...
 - after-event violation...
- > Influencing & causal factors to characterize violations. :
 - > House Model of Violations :10 keys/152 factors (2015/2016 한성호 외)
- ➤ Just Culture (2019 NSSC, 2020 Jung) -> *Validity of Responsibility*
- ➤ EOC(error of commission) and EOO(error of omission) (2019 Kim)
- > Security Error & Fitness-For-Duty (2018 서영아 외, 2019 임만성 외, 2020김정환 외)

3. Analysis of Culpability in Violations

- Culpability of Human Error
 - Validity with Objectivity
 - > Responsibility Allocation => Sharp-End/Organized Irresponsibility Issue (2016/2019 이용희)
- Technical Approach : Human Error 1.0~3.0
 - > separated/layered analysis new type of human errors during event investigations
- Multi-layered Analysis with three additive layers of analysis on events.
 - > L1 : functional level of events (event sequence)
 - > L2: behavioral level of human assignments: R&R
 - L3 : culpability level
- Two Separated Dimensions of Culpability
 - > Validity to Blame the (Personal/Org.) Responsibility
 - ➤ Worthiness to ask (Personal/Org.) Responsibility for Remedial Countermeasures

4. A FRAMEWORK PROPOSED FOR VIOLATION INVESTIGATIONS


- *Human Error 3.0* changes the main focus of investigations from the factual causes to the practical countermeasures (2016, 2018, 2019 Lee).
 - Multi-layered Analysis with three additive layers of culpability.
- Simplified Haddon-Matrix **다계층/다관점 분석** : L3에서 책임성과 별도 분석
 - > 기본 3 원칙 : three basic principles proposed
 - (1) 규칙(수준) 비례 원칙
 - (2) 책임(respo.) < 권한/능력 (capability)
 - (3) 원인(cause) < 대책 (countermeasure)

5. Conclusion and Discussion


- How to Treat Violations in Nuclear Events?
 - > Safety Culture?
 - > (Personal/Org.) Responsibility?
 - Remedial Countermeasures to Enhance Safety
- INVALUABLE LESSONS LEARNED for Nuclear Safety
 - > Retrospective to Proactive
 - Subjective Importance of Events
- People Analytics with Big-Data


Operational

Sampling



► HED Resolution





Intended


HFE Design




Cycle


Latent organizational








Acts of Sabotage






















6. References

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