Sensitivity Analysis of Simplified CCF Application in a Fault Tree with the Different Design Configuration

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1. Introduction

Common Cause Failure The failure or unavailable state of more than one component during the mission time and due to the **same shared cause** in PRA.

Root The most basic reasons for the component failure.

Coupling Th **Factor** as

The Characteristic of group of component as same casual mechanism of failure.

CCF results from the coexistence of two main factors ; a root cause and a coupling factor. That creates the condition for multiple components to be affected by the same cause.



The CCF modeling becomes complicated and huge in advanced nuclear power plant. Because of the redundant systems and components for the safe operation.



The simplified CCF modeling is incorporated into the fault tree modeling. Calculation based on the alpha factor model introduced in the NUREG/CR-5485.

2.1 Common Cause Impacting Components

W The Common Cause Component Group (CCCG) consist of Common Cause Basic Events (CCBEs).

CCBEs involves failure of a specific set of components due to a common cause.

Formula (1) : To calculate the number of common cause impacting k components.

$$N_{k}^{(m)} = \binom{m}{k} = m C_{k} = \frac{m!}{k!(m-k)!}, \ 1 \le k \le m$$

m = size of CCCG.

 $N_k^{(m)}$ = the number of common cause impacting of k components.

Table I: The number of common cause impacting k components

m $N_k^{(m)}$	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
$N_l^{(m)}$	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
$N_{2}^{(m)}$	1	3	6	10	15	21	28
$N_3^{(m)}$		1	4	10	20	35	56
$N_4^{(m)}$			1	5	15	35	70
$N_5^{(m)}$				1	6	21	56
$N_6^{(m)}$					1	7	28
$N_7^{(m)}$						1	8
$N_8^{(m)}$							1
Total	3	7	15	31	63	127	255



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2.2 Simplified CCF Probability Calculation

Formula (2) : The CCF Probability developed by Alpha-Factor model in NUREG/CR-5485.

for a staggered testing

 $Q_k^{(m)} = \frac{1}{\binom{m-1}{k-1}} \alpha_k Q_t$

- m = size of CCCG.
- Q_t = Total failure probability of each component.
- α_k = Fraction of the total probability of failure event.

Formula (3) : The simplified CCF Method is simplification by summing alpha factor. for a staggered testing This method can reduce the total number of CCBEs in one CCCG.

 $Q_{S}^{(m)} = \sum_{k=i}^{n} \alpha_{k} Q_{t}, \ 1 < i < n \le m \qquad i = \text{The start number of simplification group.}$ n = The end number of simplification group.

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2.3 Case for Comparison of CCF calculation



Fig. 1. Three cases composed to four valves





Case 2 : Two lines are arranged in parallel, each line contains two MOVs in series.
The failure of three or more valves will cause the train failure.
Two valves that one in each line also will cause the train failure.



Case 3 : MOVs are arranged in series.

The failure of **only one valve** will cause the train failure.

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2.4 Comparison of CCF Calculation Method

Table II: Data of General CCF Calculation (Method1)

a	Alpha Factor		CCF Parameter	$Q^{k^{(4)}}$	
S	α_{l}	9.75E-01	-	-	
	α_2	1.54E-02	5.13E-03	2.16E-06	
	α_3	6.50E-03	2.17E-03	9.13E-07	
	α_4	3.37E-03	3.37E-03	1.42E-06	

The CCF probabilities of each case of trains are calculated by following three methods.

 \checkmark The Date of each CCF calculation Method are shown in each table.

Method1. Base Model

• General CCF Calculation Method

Method2. 1-Simplified Model

- 2/4+3/4+4/4 CCF: Simplified CCF Method
- In formula (3), *i*=2, *n*=4

Method3. 2-Simplified Model

- 2/4 CCF: General CCF Calculation Method
- 3/4 + 4/4 CCF: Simplified CCF Method
- In formula (3), *i*=3, *n*=4

Table III: Data of 1-Simplified CCF Calculation (Method2)

Alı	oha Factor	CCF Parameter	$Qs^{(4)}$	
α_{I}	9.75E-01	-	-	
α_2	1.54E-02			
α_3	6.50E-03	2.53E-02*	1.06E-05*	
α_4	3.37E-03			

Note. * Calculated by Simplified Method

Table IV: Data of 2-Simplified CCF Calculation (Method3)

Alp	ha Factor	CCF Parameter	$Qs^{(4)}$	
α_1	9.75E-01	-	-	
α_2	1.54E-02	5.13E-03	2.16E-06	
α_3	6.50E-03	0.975.02*	4 155 06*	
α4	3.37E-03	9.8/E-03	4.15E-00	

Note. * Calculated by Simplified Method

2.4 Comparison of CCF Calculation Method

V The Fault Tree modeling of each Method are shown in following diagram.



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2.5 Results of Comparison

Table V: Result of CCF Calculation Method Comparison for Each Case

	Case 1		Case 2		Case 3	
Method	Prob.	Deviation	Prob.	Deviation	Prob.	Deviation
Method1 ; Base Model	1.42E-06	-	1.44E-05	-	1.70E-03	-
Method2 ; 1-Simplified	1.06E-05	+650%	1.14E-05	-21%	1.70E-03	-0.43%
Method3 ; 2-Simplified	4.15E-06	+193%	1.35E-05	-6%	1.70E-03	-0.05%

Case 1. MOVs are arranged in parallel



The deviations of probability for CCFs are the highest,

because the impact of the CCF events is dominant for parallel configuration failure.



When using Method2, the Simplified CCF event is the only event of common cause failure.





Case 1

The Simplified CCF calculation method is very conservative in Case 1.

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Case 2. 2 lines are arranged in parallel that contains

2 MOVs are arranged in series

V T

The deviations of probability for CCFs are quietly high, because of **insufficient consideration** of CCF events.

Failure of two or more valves except for two valves failure in same line causes the failure of this case.

In Method2, CCF event of V001/V002/V003 is considered 'Simplified CCF of 2/4, 3/4, 4/4 Fail to Close'

In Method3, CCF event of V001/V002/V003 is considered 'Simplified CCF of 3/4, 4/4 Fail to Close'



Simplified CCF



Case 2

These CCF event is not considered in Method2 because one Simplified CCF event is considered only.

W The Simplified CCF calculation method is estimated lower than base model in Case 2.

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Case 3. MOVs are arranged in series



The deviations of probability for CCFs are the lowest,

because **the impact of each component failure is higher than CCF events** for series configuration failure.

⁷ The results of **using Simplified Method are very similar** with Method1.

Case 3

 \checkmark The Simplified CCF calculation method has been well applied in Case 3.

3. Conclusions



The sensitivity study has been performed to understand the effectiveness of the Simplified CCF modeling with different train design configurations.

- In the parallel configuration model like Case 1, the Simplified CCF Calculation is estimated to be very conservative.
- - The components are placed in series like Case 2 and Case 3, it is estimated to be non-conservative because the CCF events are less considered.





- A PRA for an advanced nuclear power plant includes a lot of CCCGs. It consist of many components due to its redundant design.
- If the Simplified CCF Calculation Method is applied to PRA model in these conditions, it is necessary to consider very cautiously.

REFERENCES

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