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## Selection of the Important Performance Influencing Factors for the Assessment of Human Error under Accident Management Situations in Nuclear Power Plants

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CREAM, SLIM, INTENT 10 .

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#### Abstract

This paper introduces the process and final results of selection of the important Performance Influencing Factors (PIFs) under emergency operation and accident management situations in nuclear power plants for use in the assessment of human errors. We collected two types of PIF taxonomies, one is the full set PIF list mainly developed for human error analysis, and the other is the PIFs for human reliability analysis (HRA) in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). 5 PIF taxonomies among the full set PIF list and 10 PIF taxonomies among HRA methodologies (CREAM, SLIM, INTENT, ...) were collected in this research. By reviewing and analyzing PIFs selected for HRA methodologies, the criterion could be established for the selection of appropriate PIFs under emergency operation and accident management situations. Based on this selection criteria, a new PIF taxonomy was proposed for the assessment of human error under emergency operation and accident management situations in nuclear power plants.

I.

가 (PSA: Probabilistic Safety

Assessment) . (HRA)

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[1] 가 THERP[2], 가 HEART[3], CREAM[4] (Basic HEP) , SLIM[5], IDA[6] 가 가 가 Swain's THERP[2], Williams' HEART[3], Whalley's PHECA[7], Gerdes' Influencing Factors[8], Bellamy's PSF Taxonomy[9] 5 SLIM[5,10], INTENT[11], IDA[6], HRMS[12], Julius' Errors of Commission[13], Macwan's Errors of Commission[14], INCORECT[15], CREAM[4], Taylor-Adams' PSF Taxonomy for CORE-DATA[16], Rogers' PSF Taxonomy for CORE-DATA[17] Η IIIIV II. 1. (PIF) (context) (condition) [18]. , PSF (Performance

Shaping Factors), PIF (Performance Influencing Factors), IF (Influencing Factors), PAF (Performance Affecting Factors), EPC (Error Producing Conditions), Context Factors, CPCs (Common Performance Conditions)

2. 가 가 1) Swain's THERP (1983) Swain external PSFs, stressors PSFs, internal PSFs 67 **PSFs** external PSFs Situational Characteristics, Job & Task Instructions, Task & Equipment Characteristics Stressors PSFs Psychological Stressors Physiological Stressors , Internal PSFs Organismic Factors Williams' HEART (1986, 1988) HEART(Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique) 38 EPC(Error-Producing Conditions) , EPC "nominal probability" Whalley's PHECA (1987) **PHECA** 1987 S. Whalley (Chemical Process Plants) **PSF** . Whalley **PSF** 5 PSF List (Swain & **PSF** Guttmann, Embrey, Singh, AMAS, Ergonomic literature) **PSF** (Company Accident Reports, Medical Department Records, Incident Reports, Plant Log Books, Supervisor Records, Computer 5 가 **PSF** Printout) . Process, Personnel, Ergonomic 가 Gerdes' Influencing Factors (1997) , 32 Gerdes **PSF** IF (Influence Factor) **PSF** 108 IFs HUMAN, TASK, MACHINE, ENVIRONMENT Bellamy's PSF Taxonomy Bellamy (conditions), 8 (performance shaping factors) : Individual

Characteristics, Instructions and Procedures, Stresses, Environment, Socio-Technical Factors. THERP

Factors, Man-Machine Interface Characteristics (Displays and Controls), Task Demands, Task

Stresses .

1 .

- Embrey's SLIM (1984) & PLG-SLIM (1994)

Embrey 7† SLIM 7†

, 1 [5]

. PLG SLIM 가 . Embrey SLIM PLG SLIM

가 . Embrey SLIM PLG SLIM SLI (Success Likelihood Index) .

- INEL INTENT (1992)

2)

INTENT (errors of intention) 가 ,

- Phillips' IDA (or STAHR) (1985)

IDA ( STAHR)

- Kirwan' s HRMS (1997)

HRMS

- Macwan's Errors of Commission (1994)

Macwan , PIFs(Performance Influencing Factors)
(misdiagnosis)

, [2, 19, 20] . PIF

가 . PIF ,

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. 1 ,

- Julius' Errors of Commission (1995)

Julius 7† PIF Macwan (1995) PIF

, context-independent PIFs

context-dependent PIFs ,

가 Julius 가 PIFs 1

- Hollnagel' s CREAM (1997)

	Hollnagel	(context	factors)	1			9	CPCs (Common
	Performance C	onditions)		,	PSF			
		가						, CPCs
						가		
-	Kontogiannis'	INCORECT (199	7)					
	Kontogiannis	Hollnagel					,	CREAM
				가				,
	가		, dynamic	event tree	[21]	Risk 7	ŀ	
		. INCORECT		1	10	Performa	nce Cond	litions
	. Kontogia	nnis				'stress', 'wor	kloaď, 'í	task complexity'
-	Taylor-Adams'	CORE-DATA (1	995)					
	CORE-DATA	(Computerized O	perator Re	liability and	l Error Da	ntabase)		
	Birming	ham University	Tay	lor-Adams				
	CORE-DATA	5			가	,	ext	ternal error mode,
	psychological	error mechanism	, performa	ance shapin	g factors,	task-equipme	ent taxon	omy, human action
	taxonomy	. perform	nance sha	ping factors	PHEC	A, THERP, H	EART	
		16						
-	Rogers' PSF Ta	axonomy for COR	E-DATA	(1996)				
	CORE-DATA		PSF	가				PSF
				, 1		PSI	7	
	Rogers				17	PSF		

1.

Original SLIM	PLG-SLIM	HRMS	INTENT
1. Quality of design	Plant interface and	1. Time	1. HMI
2. Meaningfulness of	indications of conditions	2. Quality of	2. Stress
procedures	<ol><li>Significant preceding</li></ol>	information/interface	3. SRK
3. Role of operations	and concurrent actions	3. Training/ Expertise/	4. Experience
4. Teams	<ol><li>Task complexity</li></ol>	Experience/	<ol><li>Safety culture</li></ol>
5. Stress	4. Procedural guidance	Competence	6. Training
6. Morale /Motivator	5. Training and experience	4. Procedures	7. Motivation
7. Competence	6. Adequacy of time to	<ol><li>Task organization</li></ol>	8. Workload
	accomplish action	<ol><li>Task complexity</li></ol>	9. Supervision
	7. Stress		10. Communication
	8. Other		11. Procedures
IDA	CREAM	Kontogiannis'	Taylor-Adams' PSFs for
		Performance Conditions	CORE-DATA

		1. Time availability			
1. Quality of			1. Alarms		
information	information organization		2. Communication		
- Design	2. Working conditions	accessibility	3. Ergonomic design		
<ul> <li>Meaningfulness of</li> </ul>	- Meaningfulness of 3. Adequacy of MMI and		4. HMI ambiguous		
procedures operational support		and accessibility	<ol><li>HMI feedback</li></ol>		
2. Organization	4. Availability of	4. Simultaneous tasks	6. Labels		
<ul> <li>Role of operations</li> </ul>	procedures/plans	5. Decision-making criteria	7. Lack of		
- Teams	5. Number of simultaneous	6. Response dynamics and	supervision/checks		
3. Personal	goals	system coupling	8. Procedures		
- Stress	6. Available time	7. Supervision	9. Refresher training		
- Morale/ Motivation	7. Time of day	8. Capability degrading	10. Stress		
- Competence	8. Adequacy of training	factors (CDFs)	11. Task complexity		
•	and preparation	<ol><li>Teamwork and social</li></ol>	12. Task criticality		
	• •	factors	13. Task novelty		
		10. Organizational factors	14. Time pressure		
			15. Training		
			16. Workload		
Rogers' Revised PSFs	Macwan's commission error	Julius' commission erro	or		
for CORE-DATA					
1. Adequacy of HMI	<ul> <li>Scenario-independent PIFs</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Context-independent</li> </ul>	PIFs		
2. Training	Crew training and experience	- Training related			
3. Procedures	2. Crew confidence	1. Degree of familiarity with and frequency of training on,			
4. Adequacy of	3. Relative experience of RO and	EOPs;			
Supervision/Monitori	SRO 4. Recent experience with one or	2. General philosophy towards using the EOPs;			
ng	more faulty signals	Generic rules for handling procedural ambiguities;     Method of resolving conflicting information from different			
5. Communication	Scenario-dependent PIFs	instrumentations.	8		
6. Team organization	- Plant related		- Crew team characteristic		
7. Stress	5. Values of critical parameters	5. Team structure;			
8. Task complexity	6. Rate of change of critical	6. Established protocol for a	6. Established protocol for communication;		
9. Task	parameters	7. Adequacy of resources;			
novelty/unfamiliarity	7. Instrument failure	- Plant related	- Plant related		
10. Workload	- EOP related	8. Human factors design of the plant			
11. Distractions	8. Phase of EOP	Context-dependent PIFs     Plant related			
12. Adverse conditions	<ul><li>9. Type of logic structure</li><li>10. Number of logical conditions</li></ul>	9. Value of critical parameter;			
13. Fatigue	- Operator related	10. Trend of critical parameters;			
14. Motivation	11. Operator diagnosis		11. Availability of equipment;		
15. Safety culture	12. Memory of recent actions		12. Availability of instrumentation		
16. Adequacy of design	13. Perceived importance	- EOP related			
17. Robustness of	14. Perceived consequences	13. EOP response phase (verification, diagnosis)			
design	15. Operator expectations	- Operator related			
design		14. Confidence in diagnosis			
		15. Expectation			
		16. Memory of previous act	16. Memory of previous actions and accident history		

IV.

(1) , (set) (2)

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(3) (1)

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• HUMAN:

• SYSTEM: H/W

• TASK:

• ENVIRONMENT:

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Level I	Level II	Level III & IV	
Level I ENVIRONMENT	Level II Team & Organization Factors	Management & Policy (Gerdes)  - work/rest schedule (Gerdes, Swain)  - shift rotation (Swain)  - supporting team  - level of supervision  - inadequate instruction  - plant policy (here and Swain)  - rewards and punishments (Gerdes, Swain)   Team Communication Related Factors  - structure of instruction/information delivery  - standardization in instruction/information delivery	
		<ul> <li>standard communication network (Salas)</li> <li>media of instruction/information delivery (:page phone, fax, paper, etc.)</li> <li></li> </ul>	

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# THERP, ASEP, HCR 가 SLIM, IDA , INTENT 가 CREAM, INCORECT 가 가 (simultaneous goals and tasks)' NRC ATHEANA[23] , MMI 가 ( , training, experience, motivation, ..), ( , procedure, MMI, organization factors...). : training, experience, procedure, MMI/information, time : stress, workload, motivation, task complexity, simultaneous tasks/goals, working condition, supervision, team factors, communication : adequacy of resources, decision making criteria, response dynamics & system coupling, availability of equipment, trend and value of critical parameters, time of day, organization factors, task organization, safety culture )가 가 가 가 가 <stress, workload, task complexity, 가 safety culture, organization factor> 가 가

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4.	PIFs		
HUMAN	1. Training & Experience	1.	Adequacy of training (frequency, recent training,
HOWIN	1. Training & Experience	1.	fidelity of simulation program)
		2.	Experiences/practices of real operating events
		3.	Learning of the past events/experiences
		4.	Career of operator
TASK	2. Availability & Quality	1.	Availability
	of Procedures	2.	Format or type
		3.	Clarity of instruction and terminology
		4.	Decision making criterion
		5.	Logic structure
	3. Simultaneous	1.	Number of simultaneous goals/tasks
	Goals/Tasks	2.	Priority bet. goals/tasks
	4. Control Type of Task	1.	Dynamic/Step-by-step
SYSTEM	5. Availability & Quality	1.	Information availability (instrumentation fail/stuck)
	of Information	2.	Clearness of meaning (Direct
			indication/Interpretation required/
			Ambiguous/Unreliable information)
		3.	Distinguishability of information
		4.	Control display relationships
	6. Status & Trend of	1.	Value of critical parameters
	Critical Parameters	2.	Trend of critical parameters (Rate of change of
			critical parameters
		3.	Number of dynamic changing variables
		4.	Degree of alarm avalanche
	7. Status of Safety	1.	Success/Fail state of safety system/component
	System/Component	2.	Level of trust on the system/component
	8. Time Pressure	1.	Available time vs. Required time
ENVIRONMENT	9. Working Env. Features	1.	Task location: (MCR/Local CR/Local area)
		2.	Accessibility
	10. Team Cooperation &	1.	Clearness in role/responsibility definition
	Communication	2.	Direction, type, method, protocol
		3.	Standardization in instruction/information delivery
		4.	Team cohesiveness/collaboration
	11. Plant Policy & Safety	1.	Plant specific prioritized (or preference for
	Culture	1	/objection to) goals/strategies
		2.	Safety/economy tradeoff
	<u> </u>	3.	Routine violations

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Swain's THERP, Williams' HEART, Whalley's PHECA,

Gerdes' Influencing Factors, Bellamy's PSF Taxonomy 5

SLIM, INTENT, IDA, HRMS, Julius' Errors of

Commission, Macwan's Errors of Commission, INCORECT, CREAM, Taylor-Adams' PSF Taxonomy for CORE-DATA, Rogers' PSF Taxonomy for CORE-DATA 10 . ,

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