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A Study on the Appropriateness Evaluation of the Step Complexity Measure for Emergency Operating Procedures

1, 2, 3, 4, 5 가
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full-scope simulator

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ABSTRACT

In this study, to verify the appropriateness of step complexity (SC) measure, estimated SC values for steps in emergency operating procedures are compared with averaged step performance time data. According to the results of this comparison, since estimated SC values are reasonably accordance with averaged step performance time data, it is concluded that SC measure can be used to quantify the degree of complexity of steps included in emergency operating procedures.

I.

가

(symptom-

based emergency operating procedure)가

가

(workload)

(procedure step step)

(critical safety function)

가 가 [1-2].

" "

[4, 5].

(error) 가

[6, 7] 가

checklist 가 [8-10].

checklist 가 가

가 가

가 가

checklist 가 , "

mock-up test (walk-through) "

가 /

가가

(, 가

) 가 mock-up

(entropy)

(step complexity; SC) 가 가 가 [11].

가

가 가

가 (sub-measure) 가 가

(weighting factor) (Euclidean norm)

가

full-scope simulator

가

가 , non-linear curve fitting

가

가

가

II.

가 (SC)

1)

, 2) 3) (floating step) (continuous action step)

[11]

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< 1. >

[12, 13]	•	
[14, 15]	• /	
[8]	• •	
[16]	• • /	
[17]	• (the number of check items)	
[18]	• (the depth due to sub-tasks included in a given task)	

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가 가 가

[11].

(step complexity;

SC)

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가

가

가 (Euclidean norm)

$$SC = \sqrt{(\alpha \cdot SIC)^2 + (\beta \cdot SLC)^2 + (\gamma \cdot SSC)^2}$$

, α, β, γ SIC, SLC, SSC 2
 [11]

< 2. 가 가 >

SIC (Step Information Complexity)	
SLC (Step Logic Complexity)	
SSC (Step Size Complexity)	
$\alpha = 0.38$	SC SIC (SIC 가)
$\beta = 0.32$	SC SLC
$\gamma = 0.30$	SC SSC

2 , SIC, SLC SSC
 , SIC, SLC SSC 가 α, β, γ
 가 AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process)
 (0.38, 0.32 0.30)

III. 가

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2000 1 6

(loss of coolant accident; LOCA)

(excess steam dump event; ESDE)

ESDE 15
 가
 " (Standard Post Trip Action; SPTA)"
 가 LOCA ESDE
 SPTA 3

< 3. >


ESDE			LOCA			SPTA		
Step	SC ¹⁾	Time ²⁾	Step	SC ¹⁾	Time ²⁾	Step	SC ¹⁾	Time ²⁾
ESDE-1	1.0300	13.10	LOCA-1	1.0300	9.00	SPTA-1	1.0601	16.61
ESDE-2	1.0300	11.40	LOCA-2	1.0300	8.00	SPTA-2	1.2470	10.46
ESDE-3	1.0300	3.36	LOCA-3	1.0300	6.29	SPTA-3	1.3300	18.35
ESDE-4	1.5071	18.33	LOCA-4	1.0300	6.75	SPTA-4	1.4060	13.33
ESDE-5	1.5214	27.60	LOCA-5	1.3811	21.40	SPTA-5	1.5920	22.13
ESDE-6	1.5214	10.00	LOCA-6	1.4852	18.25	SPTA-6	1.6550	20.20
ESDE-7	1.6150	24.00	LOCA-7	1.5071	31.50	SPTA-7	1.7220	32.64
ESDE-8	1.6810	23.33	LOCA-8	1.5214	16.67	SPTA-8	2.0943	42.72
ESDE-9	1.6948	45.25	LOCA-9	1.5214	37.83	SPTA-9	2.2063	59.31
ESDE-10	1.7894	35.60	LOCA-10	1.5214	12.00	SPTA-10	2.2381	62.62
ESDE-11	1.8175	40.38	LOCA-11	1.6150	38.36	SPTA-11	2.3570	75.86
ESDE-12	1.9096	42.50	LOCA-12	1.6948	20.00			
ESDE-13	1.9408	61.13	LOCA-13	1.6948	42.00			
ESDE-14	2.1582	63.43	LOCA-14	1.8175	24.20			
ESDE-15	2.1906	60.50	LOCA-15	1.9096	40.55			
			LOCA-16	1.9135	55.33			
			LOCA-17	2.8570	121.67			

1) $\alpha = 0.38, \beta = 0.32 \quad \gamma = 0.3$
 2) sec

III. 1.

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 1 가
 가 (R = 0.904). (analysis of variance;
 ANOVA)
 가 ($F_{0.01}(1, 41) = 7.269 < F(1, 41) = 183.34$).

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III. 2.

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SIC, SLC SSC

$\alpha, \beta \quad \gamma$

SIC, SLC SSC

가

AHP (Analytical Hierarchy Process)

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[11]. 가

AHP

가

(multi-criteria decision making)

[19].

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SRO 가 가

$\alpha = 0.38, \beta = 0.32 \quad \gamma = 0.3$

가

가

가

3

SIC,

SLC SSC


non-linear curve fitting

4

2

< 4. Non-linear curve fitting >

Fitting equation: $\text{Averaged Time} = p_1 \cdot \sqrt{(p_2 \cdot \text{SIC})^2 + (p_3 \cdot \text{SLC})^2 + (p_4 \cdot \text{SSC})^2} + p_5$				
Parameter	Value	New α, β and γ	Old α, β and γ (from AHP)	% of Difference
P_1	50.3	-	-	-
P_2	-48.4	-	-	-
P_2	0.27	0.27	0.38	30%
P_3	0.29	0.29	0.32	10%
P_4	0.44	0.44	0.30	48%
χ^2 for fitting equation = 91.80				



2.

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SLC

, 가 SIC (

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SSC (

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$$(R^2 = 0.829, F(1, 41) = 198.75 \rightarrow R^2 = 0.848,$$

$$F(1, 41) = 229.5).$$

IV.

가

(SC) 가

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