

3

A Study on the Optimization of Test Interval for Check Valves of Ulchin Unit 3 Using the Risk-informed In-Service Testing Approach

, , ,

가 , 3 가

- 가 , 3 가
- 가 가 가 가
- 가 가 가 :
- HSSCs 11.48% 24 , ISSCs 19.14% 40 , LSSCs 69.38% 462
- 가 가 ISSCs2가 6 , LSSCs 40
- 가 6 7692
- 1333 82.7% 가

Abstract

We optimized the test interval for check valves of Ulchin Unit 3 using the risk-informed in-service testing (IST) approach. First, we categorized the IST check valves for Ulchin Unit 3 according to their contributions to the safety of Ulchin Unit 3. Next, we performed the risk analysis on the relaxation of test interval for check valves identified as relatively low important to the safety of Ulchin Unit 3 to identify the maximum increasable test interval of them. Finally, we estimated the number of tests of IST check valves to be performed due to the changes of test interval. These study results are as follows:

- The categorization of IST check valve importance; the number of the HSSCs is 24(11.48%), the ISSCs is 40 (19.14%), and the LSSCs is 462(69.38%)
- The maximum increasable test interval; 6 times of current test interval of ISSCs2 and 40 times of that of LSSCs
- The number of tests of IST check valves to be performed during 6 refueling time can be reduced from 7692 to 1333 (82.7%).

1.

(risk-informed) 가 (In-Service Testing: IST)
가(Probabilistic Safety Assessment: PSA)

[1, 2, 3, 4, 5].

(high safety significant components: HSSCs)
(low safety significant components: LSSCs)
PSA 가 /
가 (expert panel) IST
,
HSSCs IST (performance
degradation) , LSSCs IST (operability
readiness) [2].
가 가
, 1992 IST PSA [6].
1998 IST ASME [5] 가[1]
IST

(risk-informed technical specification change) 가 (risk-informed in-service inspection)
/ 가

가 [4, 6, 7, 8],
[9], IST
[10, 11, 12]

IST
3 IST 가
IST 3
3

가
가 2

가 3
가, 4

2.

가

2.1

[1, 13] ASME [5] PSA
(risk) (core damage frequency:

CDF) (large early release frequency: LERF) FV(Fussel-
 Vesely) 가 (Risk Achievement Worth: RAW) .
 (importance measures) :

$$FV = [R_o - R_i(-)] / R_o = 1 - R_i(-) / R_o \dots\dots\dots (1)$$

$$RAW = R_i(+)/R_o \dots\dots\dots (2)$$


R_o: ,
 R_i(+): 이가 ,
 R_i(-): 이가

1 FV RAW 3가 , HSSCs (High Safety Significant components), ISSCs (Intermediate Safety Significant components), LSSCs (Low Safety Significant components) . ISSCs RAW > 2 , 0.005 > FV > 0.001
 가 ISSCs1 , RAW > 2 FV < 0.001 가 ISSCs2

1. PSA

	FV	가 (RAW)
HSSCs	FV{CDF} or FV{LERF} > .005	
ISSCs	FV{CDF} and FV{LERF} < .005	RAW{CDF} or RAW{LERF} > 2.0
LSSCs	FV{CDF} and FV{LERF} < .005 or Truncated Components	RAW{CDF} and RAW{LERF} < 2.0 or Truncated Components

1 [4, 7, 11].
 PSA (core damage frequency: CDF)
 (large early release frequency: LERF) FV 가
 가 , FV 가 .
 PSA, / PSA, [14, 15]. PSA
 ISSCs LSSCs (simplified failure
 modes and effect analysis) HSSCs가
 (P&ID) 가 ,
 PSA
 FV 가 (P&ID) 가
 PSA
 (expertise) (engineering judgment)



1.

[4, 5, 11, 13] PSA

;





10 가

- : HSSCs가 95%
- :
- :

(single failure event)

(CCF)

1.0×10^{-11}

KIRAP[16]

PSA

[4, 7, 11]:

- (simplified failure modes and effects analysis) 가

- 가
- FV 가
- FV 가 FV 가

$$X_{CRI}(i) = X(i) * CRI / FV(X(i)) \dots \dots \dots (3)$$

X(i): i , , i가

X_{CRI}(i): FV 가 CRI i ,

, i가

FV(X(i)): i , ,

i가 FV

CRI: 1 HSSCs (0.005)

가 (logic tree

structure)

가

가

가

가

가

PSA

PSA

(3)

가

, (3)

FV

가

PSA

FV

RAW

PSA

, P&ID,

2.2

(failure on demand) (standby failure) . (4) :

$$q_T = q_D + \lambda * T / 2 \dots \dots \dots (4)$$

, q_D , λ (standby-time failure rate), T
(test interval) (test period) .

(4)

[17]

가 가

가 가 . , 3 가

3 가 .

가 가

(fail to open),

(fail to close),

(transfer

closed),

(reverse leakage)

가 ,

가

가 :

●

가

가 .

●

λ

●

(aging effect)

●

가 .

3.

가

가

3.1

3 가

209

3,4 PSA

84

1,2

PSA

[14, 18].

1

PSA

. PSA

84

;

- HSSCs 28.57% 24 . 24 HSSCs 1 14 , 2
10 .
- ISSCs 40.47% 34 , ISSCs1 10 , ISSCs2 24
- LSSCs 30.95% 26. 95% CCF
HSSCs ISSCs

209 HSSCs 11.48% 24 , ISSCs 19.14% 40 , LSSCs 69.38% 462
 . 2가 , HSSCs LSSCs HSSCs 30.62% 64
 . / PSA PSA
 HSSCs ISSCs . PSA
 6 가 ISSCs2 .

2.

	1	2	1	/		PSA
HSSCs : 24	14	10	0	0	0	0
ISSCs1: 10	0	8	2	0	0	0
ISSCs2: 30	24	0	0	0	0	6
LSSCs: 145	26	0	0	0	0	119
- 209	64	18	2	0	0	125

3 3 가 ASCO [12]
 . PSA ASCO 1 PSA ,
 2 . PSA ASCO
 70.12% . 3 가 40% 1 PSA
 . HSSCs 3 가 .
 PSA , PSA HSSCs 가
 . PSA HSSCs
 ASCO . 3 , 1,2 PSA
 HSSCs 가 . ,
 ASCO 1 PSA HSSCs 가 , 2
 PSA HSSCs ISSCs 가 가

3.2

가
 가 ISSCs2 LSSCs
 가 가

가

- 가 :
 - 가 , ISSCs LSSCs
 - 가 HSSCs ISSCs 가
 - 가 가
 - CDF(CDF – CDF) < 1.0E-5
 - LERF(LERF – LERF) < 1.0E-6
- 가 가 10 가
- 가 가 가
- 가 가 가

3. 3 ASCO

	3 [14]	ASCO [12]
PSA	1,2 (), & / & (FMEA)	1 PSA, 2
가	가 가	
PSA	209 84 (40%)	164 115 (70.12%)
HSSCs	64(30.62%)	37 (22.56%)

- 가 LSSCs 100 가
 - 80 , 100 3 PSA
 - 10 가
 - ISSCs 가 HSSCs 가 . 가
 - 가
- 가 :
 - HSSCs/ISSCs1 가
 - ISSCs2 가 6 가가
 - LSSCs 가 40 가가

3.2 가 ISSCs2 LSSCs 가
 가 . 가 , 6
 (18 9) 3 7692 1333
 82.7%

가 , 3468
 422 87.8%

4.

3 , 3
 가
 가
 3,4 1,2 PSA , / PSA
 . PSA
 (simplified failure modes and effects analysis) (critical failure mode)

PSA

3 가 209 HSSCs가 11.48%
 24 , ISSCs가 19.14% 40 , LSSCs 69.38% 462 3
 2가 , HSSCs LSSCs HSSCs 30.62% 64
 가 ISSCs2 LSSCs

가 가 가

:

- HSSCs/ISSCs1 가
- ISSCs2 가 6 가가
- LSSCs 가 40 가가

가 가 , 6 (18 9)
 3 7692 1333 82.7%
 가
 3468 422 87.8%

IST RG 1.175 [1] 가 6 (3
) 가 가

가 가
 3

가

- 가 :
- 가

- 가 ,
- IST , ASME OMA Appendix II [17,18],
- IST

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