

가 가

Truncation Error Evaluation for Probabilistic Safety Assessment

19

PSA 가 (MCS)
 가 .
 가 .
 trend 가 event space coverage PSA MCS

Abstract

In the PSA of nuclear power plants, it is impossible to enumerate all the cut sets due to high memory requirements and long computation time. To determine a set of minimal cut sets with adequate accuracy, minimal cut sets (MCSs) with probabilities less than a specified probability cut-off value are discarded. The application of the cut-off technique entails the need to estimate the truncation error, i.e., the probability of system failure due to truncated cut sets. In this paper, the treatment status of truncation error in PSA application is summarized and a new truncation error evaluation method, which is based on the trend of MCS results in terms of newly established event space coverage, is developed.

1.

가 (PSA: Probabilistic Safety Assessment)
 가 , 가
 . PSA
 가 .

가 , 3,4 1,2 PSA
 PSA가 , 2001 8 “ ”
 가 PSA 가가 .
 가 ,
 (CDF), , LERF (Large Early Release Frequency)
 .[1,2] MCS (minimal cut
 set) PSA MCS (CDF, LERF
) (Importance Measure) .
 가 MCS ,
 가 가 .
 가 MCS
 MCS MCS (truncated set of minimal
 cuts sets) .
 (cut - off value) MCS 가
 MCS 가
 가 .
 가 ,
 가 ,
 가
 PSA 가

2.

가 (PSA: Probabilistic Safety Assessment)
 (,) MCS
 가 가 .
 가 , (top event) $h(p)$
 .

$$h(p) = \Pr\{\text{union of all MCSs}\} \quad (1)$$

 $p=(p_1, \dots, p_k)$, p_i i (basic event) .
 가 V_C
 MCS 가 . ,

MCS K_i 가

$$\Pr\{\mathbf{K}_i\} = \prod_{j \in \mathbf{K}_i} p_j > V_C \quad (2)$$

MCS 가 가

$$M(\mathbf{p}) = \Pr\{\text{truncated set of MCSs}\} \quad (3)$$

MCS $h(\mathbf{p}) > M(\mathbf{p})$ MCS 가

MCS 가 , *rare-event approximation* *min-cut upper-bound approximation* . MCS

m MCS 가 ($\mathbf{K}_i, i = 1, \dots, m$)

1) *rare-event approximation* : $M(\mathbf{p}) \approx \sum_{i=1}^m \Pr\{\mathbf{K}_i\}$

2) *min-cut upper-bound approximation* : $M(\mathbf{p}) \approx 1 - \prod_{i=1}^m [1 - \Pr\{\mathbf{K}_i\}]$

MCS 1
 $M(\mathbf{p})$ overestimate
 PSA CDF LERF MCS
 PSA

가 가 . SSCs (structures, systems and components) , 가

[3]

Risk Achievement Worth : $a_i = \frac{R_i^+}{R_0}$

Risk Reduction Worth : $r_i = \frac{R_0}{R_i^-}$

Fussell-Vesely Importance : $FV_i = \frac{R_0 - R_i^-}{R_0} = 1 - \frac{R_i^-}{R_0}$

R_i^+ = overall risk with the probability of basic event i set to 1;

R_i^- = overall risk with the probability of basic event i set to 0;

R_0 = base (reference) case overall risk.

PSA
 . Base case
 MCS
 m MCS ($\mathbf{K}_k, k = 1, \dots, m$)
 :

$$R_0 = \sum_{k=1}^m \Pr\{\mathbf{K}_k\} \quad (4)$$

m MCS i (b_i) m_i^+ MCS ($\mathbf{P}_k, k = 1, \dots, m_i^+$)
 b_i m_i^- MCS ($\mathbf{N}_k, k = 1, \dots, m_i^-$) . ($m = m_i^+ + m_i^-$)
 R_i^- MCS :

$$R_i^- = \sum_{k=1}^{m_i^-} \Pr\{\mathbf{N}_k\} \quad (5)$$

R_i^+ .
 $R_i^+ = \sum_{k=1}^{m_i^-} \Pr\{\mathbf{N}_k\} + \frac{1}{P_i} \sum_{k=1}^{m_i^+} \Pr\{\mathbf{P}_k\} \quad (6)$

MCS (R_i^+, R_i^-, R_0) 가

1 2 NRC [4]

MCS
 [5] 가 [6,7]가 .
 , 가 MCS
 term .

가 RISKMAN ISPRA - FTA .
 NRC Reg, Guide 1.174[8], 1.177[9] SRP

19 , R_i^+
 . NEI 00-02 [10] PSA

	Level 1	LERF (per yr)
Grade 1	< 0.01 * CDF Base	< 0.01 * LERF Base

Grade 2 & 3	< 0.0001 * CDF Base	< 0.0001 * LERF Base
Grade 4	< 0.00001 * CDF Base	< 0.00001 * LERF Base

Grade 1 : IPE, Prioritizing licensing issues

Grade 2 : Maintenance rule support GL 89 - 10 (MOV ranking),
Inspection activities

Grade 3 : IST, ISI, Grade QA, On - line Maintenance

Grade 4 : Risk based TS, Quality category of equipment

3. 가

MCS 가 ,
 가 MCS
 가 .
 3 1 가 rare-event
 approximation . 3
 가 .
 true value ,
 MCS
 k 가 ,
 relevant [11] , 2^k
 가 , random vector $\mathbf{X}=(x_1, \dots, x_k)$. \mathbf{X}
 (x_i=1) .

$$C_1(\mathbf{X}) = \{i : x_i = 1\} \tag{7}$$

\mathbf{X} C₁(\mathbf{X})가 MCS

$$\prod_{i \in C_1(\mathbf{X})} p_i > V_C \tag{8}$$

V_C . (8) 가 V_C 가

random vector \mathbf{X} 가 (8) . (8)

\mathbf{X} 가 (8) \mathbf{A} :

$$\mathbf{A} = \{\mathbf{X}_k : \prod_{i \in C_1(\mathbf{X}_k)} p_i > V_C\} \tag{9}$$

$\theta = \Pr\{\mathbf{A}\}$, $V_C = 1$, $\theta = 0$. θ V_C (8) $V_C = 0$ $\theta =$
 event space coverage event space coverage
 Monte Carlo Simulation random vector
 MCS event space coverage
 θ 가 (0 ~ 1) $\theta = 1$
 true value true value
 true value 가

4.

MCS PSA
 가 ,
 MCS
 true value true value (0 ~
 1) event space coverage MCS
 trend true value

[1] US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Fault tree handbook. NUREG-0492, Washington, DC, 1981.

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[5] Modarres M, Dezfuli H. A truncation methodology for evaluating large fault trees. IEEE Trans Reliab 1984; 33(4):325-328

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[8] US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). An approach for using probabilistic risk assessment in risk-informed decisions on plant-specific changes to the licensing basis. RG-1.174, Washington, DC, 1998.

[9] US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). An approach for plant-specific, risk-informed decision-making: technical specifications. RG-1.177, Washington, DC, 1998.


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[11] Barlow RE, Proschan F. Statistical theory of reliability and life testing: probability models. Silver Spring, MD, 1981.

1.


Cut-off value	# of MCS	Rare Event Approximation.	Min. cut upper bound
1.0E-5	4	1.98585996E-04	1.98572923E-04
1.0E-6	14	2.26624614E-04	2.26605634E-04
1.0E-7	55	2.36143248E-04	2.36122068E-04
1.0E-8	230	2.41640317E-04	2.41617824E-04
1.0E-9	806	2.43573632E-04	2.43550670E-04
1.0E-10	2245	2.44065653E-04	2.44042570E-04
1.0E-11	5423	2.44174462E-04	2.44151353E-04
1.0E-12	12201	2.44197792E-04	2.44174677E-04
1.0E-13	25371	2.44202363E-04	2.44179247E-04
1.0E-14	51321	2.44202724E-04	2.44179608E-04
1.0E-15	103170	2.44202724E-04	2.44179608E-04

: 677 gate : 776




1.


MCS




2.



3.



4. event space coverage



5. event space coverage