

# CANDU

## Safeguards Inspection for CANDU Nuclear Power Plant

150

CANDU  
가  
가  
2001  
IAEA  
CANDU  
가  
1  
IAEA  
CANDU

### Abstract

CANDU reactor has been required a lot of PDI for safeguards inspection due to its unique character. It is basically caused by the use of small fuel, unaccessible core fuel during PIV and the operation of dry storage. Currently safeguards efforts for 4 units of Wolsong site requires about a half of PDI given for all facilities in Korea. Safeguards inspection activities of IAEA and national inspector are based on IAEA safeguards criteria. It requires operating C/S to the main diversion paths as well as the special system to verify the discharge of core fuel. This paper shows the inspection procedures and methods for PIV and interim inspection and requirement for operator ' preparation.

1.

1975 (NPT) IAEA  
 1976  
 1995 가  
 1996  
 1997 가 1999  
 1976  
 1, 1983 1 가 14 PWR 4  
 CANDU / 가  
 33 [1].

IAEA 2001 33 143  
 427 PDI (Person Day Inspection) 가 IAEA  
 543 PDI ( : 165 PDI, : 378 PDI) [1]. 가  
 IAEA 가  
 IAEA  
 가 IAEA  
 가 CANDU  
 IAEA 가  
 CANDU

## 2. CANDU

CANDU  
 , 2000 20  
 IAEA  
 CANDU IAEA 1,386  
 584 가 20  
 PDI 10% [2]. CANDU 600MW 380  
 4,560 2 3 16 24  
 CANDU 가  
 가  
 1983 1 가 4 CANDU 600MW

7  
 1 1992 5,000  
 3 CANDU 600MW 3,500 MWD/MTU  
 1 60g  
 IAEA 가 [3] CANDU 120  
 가 (SQ: Significant Quantity)  
 (8 kg) IAEA 60  
 0.3 SQ

### 3. CANDU

2 4  
 4 1 1 (MBP :  
 Material Balance Period) (MBA : Material Balance Area)  
 (PIV : Physical Inventory Verification) 3  
 (Interim Inspection)  
 1 1 (KMP : Key  
 Measurement Point) KMP  
 Stratum (Safeguards Criteria)  
 [4] 가  
 (Random Low) 20~50% ( 10~50%  
 ) (Random Medium) 50~90% ,  
 (Random High) 90% [4,8]

#### 1. SQ

		(SQ)	
DIRECT USE MATERIAL	Pu ( )	8 kg Pu	1
	HEU (20% )	25 kg U-235	1
	U-233	8 kg U-233	1
	Pu in Spent Fuel	8 kg Pu	3
INDIRECT USE MATERIAL	LEU (20% )	75 kg U-235	12
	NU	10 ton	12
	DU	20 ton	12
	Th	20 ton	12



2.2 (a) (b)  
 (a) (DNLEU) (Item Counting)

Annex F

6

ANNEX F : Procedures for Sampling Plans

6. Items in closed containers

6.2 (b) In-direct use material

[4]

$$n_1 = N_1 (1 - b^{(X/M)})$$

$n_1$  : ( )

$N_1$  : ( )

$b$  : Non-Detection Probability (1 - Detection Probability)

$X$  : (19.1kg-U /Bundle)

$M$  : 1 SQ (Significant Quantity) = 10,000kg

IAEA

36

(2~3 )

HM-4

HM-

5

(Method H)

[5]

Stratum

가

CANDU

1 SQ

10

560

12

1

1

가

가

가

가

가

가

2

1

1

4

4

3.2

380

4,560

CANDU 600MW

가  
IAEA / OLR (On Load Reactor) CANDU  
KMP 2 /  
MUX  
DMOS 가  
CDM (Core Discharge Monitor), SFBC (Spent Fuel Bundle Counter) Y/N  
Monitor VIFM (VXI Integrated Fuel Monitor) [4].  
2 CDM (A-side, C-side)  
/ CDM Assembly 1  
가 CDM  
Ion Chamber Fission  
Chamber 가  
A-side 8  
C-side 8  
가 Ion Chamber Fission Chamber  
가 가  
가  
Discharge Port Discharge Bay  
Discharge Port SFBC 가  
A-side C-side  
Yes/No Monitor 가  
IAEA  
(PIT : Physical Inventory Taking)  
가 (Refueling History)  
IAEA [4].

2.3

(a)

(a)

(b)


(SFBC)가

(b)

(CDM)

(SFBC)

3



2.

IAEA

3.3

Reception Bay

24

(Tray)

IAEA

/

(MUX or DMOS)

Surveillance) (Declaration for 가

IAEA [4]

2.4 C/S (a) ~ (c)  
 (b) C/S 가  
 가

(i)  
 (ii) CDM, SFBC  
 (iii) 0.3 Q 가

3 가 가 , 16~19  
 10% [4.9]

$$n_1 = N_1 (1 - b^{(X/M)})$$

$n_1$  : ( Stacked Bundle Column )

$N_1$  : ( Stacked Bundle Column )

$b$  : Non-Detection Probability (1- Detection Probability)

$M$  : 1 SQ (Significant Quantity) = 120

$X$  : (19 19 ,

80 Stack 31.7 32

Column

IAEA 가 SCAI-2 (Spent  
 CANDU Fuel Identifier-2)<sup>[6]</sup> SCAV (Spent CANDU Fuel Verifier)<sup>[7]</sup>

3

IAEA [4]

9.4 C/S (a) ~ (d)  
 (b) C/S 가  
 가



(i)  
(ii) 0.3SQ 가

(iii) CDM, SFBC  
(iv) " Inconclusive " 가

3.4  
1 45,600 ( 340~350 SQ)  
1 7  
1992  
IAEA 1 Difficult To

Access  
IAEA [4]

2.4 C/S (a) ~ (c)  
(a) C/S 가

ANNEX D : Special Criteria for Difficult to Access Fuel Items

1. Difficult to Access

C/S 가가 가

(a) DDG-SG Difficult to Access

(b) Difficult to Access 가

(c) C/S 가 " Acceptable C/S "

IAEA Cobra  
Metal Cobra Metal

$$n_1 = N_1 (1 - b^{(X/M)})$$

n<sub>1</sub> : ( )

$N_1$  : ( )  
 $b$  : Non-Detection Probability (1 - Detection Probability)  
 $M$  : 1SQ (Significant Quantity) = 120  
 $X$  : (540 )

(540 ) 1 SQ (120 )  
 (20%)

3

9.4 C/S (a) ~ (c)  
 (a) C/S 가

IAEA 가 가  
 (20%)

4.


IAEA 1 1992 가  
 2 2004 3, 4

2006 300 PDI 3 1 [3]

Difficult To Access / (Gross and Partial Defects)  
 (90%)

4.1

IAEA 가 Rehearsal  
 (ALIS), 가 SCAI (Spent  
CANDU Fuel Identifier), HSGM (High Sensitivity Gamma Monitor)  
 Shutter Door  
 Flask Rehearsal Rehearsal  
 Grapple, Flask Fuel Lifting Tool,  
 COK (Continuity Of Knowledge)



3.

4.2 Loading  
가

60

60

2

가

/

가  
Grapple

4.3 Dry & Welding  
60  
Welding Hot-cell

Dry &

/

Welding Hot-cell Flask COK Dry &

4.4

(Flask)

End Plug

End Plug

9

End Plug

Cover

Difficult To Access

Finger Print

가

5.

CANDU

IAEA 가

, 가 IAEA

가

가

, IAEA

CANDU

가

가

IAEA

, 2, 3, 4

가

가

1. " 2001 ", KAERI/MR-376/2001
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2000

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