

Nuclear Cooperation between the U.S. and India and its Implications

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1. Introduction

International communities including the U.S. have tried to resolve the nuclear standoffs of Iran and North Korea, and IAEA reported Iranian nuclear programs to the Security Council based on the non-compliance of IAEA safeguards. In this situation, the U.S. and India with the non-party of NPT announced a Joint Statement including sharing civilian nuclear cooperation in July 2005. To implement this agreement, both countries signed agreement on nuclear cooperation in an initial step in March 2006. This study examines key contents and the implications of the agreement of nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and India.

2. Major agenda in nuclear cooperation agreed between the U.S. and India

Bush's administrations have developed various methods to establish strategic cooperative relations with India, especially since 2001. India has maintained the importance of civilian nuclear cooperation as one of their parts, to meet the demand of rising energy in India. Therefore, both countries announced a Joint Statement including sharing civilian nuclear cooperation in July 2005. India's commitments in the arena of nuclear cooperation included in the joint statement are summarized as follows:

- identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA);
- taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards;
- signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities;
- working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty(FMCT);
- and ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) guidelines.

3. Implications in the international nuclear communities

It is analyzed that the joint statement was announced to responds to the rising China and meet the demand of energy. It is analyzed that the joint statement was announced to responds to the rising China and meet the demand of energy. However, this statement including nuclear cooperation with India, the NPT non-party, is reviewed as a grand exceptional case reversing global nuclear non-proliferation regime. As the U.S. recognizes India as de facto nuclear weapon state such as application for voluntary safeguards in the statement, it is expected that this agreement leads to the backlash from countries faithfully complying with the NPT.

It is difficult for the U.S. to provide international communities with assurance of non-diversion of nuclear materials and technologies transferred from the U.S. under the NPT, if India doesn't conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. Though India agrees to sign the Additional Protocol, the existence of atomic weapon programs to which inspections in India cannot be applied, doesn't lead to the assurance on non-diversion of military purposes. India has continued to produce the weapon-grade fissile materials, though supporting the negotiation of the FMCT. But in this agreement, any statements don't include the measures to stop to produce fissile materials.

The U.S. has called on countries to strengthen their national export control Acts and multilateral control guidelines. In this situation, nuclear cooperation between the two countries will result in mitigating the condition of export control and NSG guidelines to the recipient, even in the United States. Although participating countries to pursue nuclear cooperation with India in the near future agree to adjust the NSG guidelines, non-nuclear weapon states that faithfully comply with the NPT but can be excluded as the cooperative partners doesn't agree to modify them. A failure on the agreement in the NSG makes the U.S. difficult in implementing the U.S.'s nuclear nonproliferation policies. Also, there is a possibility that the China uses this case and can provide the nuclear equipments to the other non-nuclear weapon states outside the NPT such as Pakistan.

4. India approaches to other advanced nuclear countries

India has tried to expedite nuclear cooperation with advanced nuclear countries to resolve the limited natural resources and meet the rising demand of energy since July 2005. Competent other advanced nuclear countries including Russia, France, Canada and United Kingdom followed a rush of nuclear cooperation looking a newly emerging nuclear power market. In this reason, it is analyzed that they will have a priority in the giant nuclear market of India in the future. However, currently national laws or NSG guidelines of major nuclear countries require the NPT party at the least and/or comprehensive safeguards agreement of IAEA as prerequisites of nuclear cooperation. Therefore, the above participating countries of NSG will not only minimize the damage of global nuclear nonproliferation but also accelerate the efforts to modify national laws and NSG guidelines in order to achieve the their interests.

Conclusion

In the process of strengthening the efforts of international communities to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and India outside the NPT can damage the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. While the U.S. is showing a prevailing various efforts for a sanction to Iran against the NPT in the Security Council, the U.S. is maintaining that nuclear cooperation with India which may be against the NPT is essential. Also nuclear cooperation by the two countries can face a backlash of non-nuclear weapon states to faithfully comply with the NPT. Even congress members of the U.S. don't find agreed opinions to this double standard. If this agreement by the U.S. and India is to be implemented, Bush' administrations have to modify national laws based on the approval of the Congress, and adjust NSG guidelines based on agreement of participating countries. However, it is expected that it will not easy to get right actions from them.

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