

Nuclear Control in Korean Peninsula: Status and Prospect

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1. Introduction

This paper is aiming at finding out an authentic meaning of implementation of the IAEA Strengthened Safeguards System (SSS) in South Korea, and also the implementation of the joint agreement in North Korea concluded among the six nations on Feb. 13, 2007. The approach for development of the paper would be limited to the dimension of nuclear control.

The actual implementation of the Additional Protocol (AP) and the entry into force of the Integrated Safeguards System in a near future in South Korea have passed a few of technical and diplomatic complications. Specially the past mistakes related to declaration to IAEA made by researchers resulted in a more strengthened transparency policy in South Korea, which was announced as a form of four-point statement reassuring the international community of its commitment to a nuclear-free policy on the Korean peninsula in 2004.

North Korea rejected special inspection demanded by IAEA in 1992 related to its initial declaration to apply the IAEA INFCIRC/153 type of safeguards system. The rejection had consisted of the base line of diplomatic conflict between North Korea and international community. However, change of position of North Korea,

even being uncertain still as of today, arrived at the joint declaration of '9-19' among 6 nations of Six-Party Talks in 2005, which developed into the conclusion of joint agreement for the implementation of the '9-19' principles on Feb. 13, 2007.

2. Denuclearization and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is an essential purpose of the Six-Party talks. If there is any important gap in the policies regarding the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula between two Koreas and neighboring countries, it's really difficult to have a consensus for the denuclearizing issue. However, two Koreas have already shown their evident position favorable for the denuclearization through the joint declaration of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1992.

Based on a series of policies of denuclearization, an institutional approach for its implementation was initiated through establishment of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) by two Koreas on March 18, 1992. North Korea's active position for nuclear control was accompanied by normalization of relations with IAEA in the beginning of 1990s. But as the time went on, the

active approach of two Koreas for bilateral nuclear control in the early 1990s has been hampered and deteriorated in the process of discussion with international nuclear control regime.

Announcing four principles for denuclearization in Korean Peninsula in 2004, South Korea put an accent to expand the scope of peaceful uses of nuclear energy with abiding by related international regulations. The latter aspect is given a concrete form through the implementation of the AP and active pursuit of early entry into force of the IS in Korea. In case of North Korea, the '2-13' agreement must wait not only to see how its implementation might be actualized during its initial implementation phase, but also to be eventually met with the diplomatic and additional result. North Korea could demand the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or sufficient supply of energy for the compensation of its abandonment of nuclear weapons or weapon program, if there is any.

The question of disarmament in Northeast Asia must go together with denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The nuclear control in international relations tends to decay under realistic configuration. That's why a minimum requirement for stabilizing nuclear control system in Northeast Asia is to establish a joint mechanism for establishing a confidential building measure among regional countries. This is based on historical aspect, particularly on the background of division of the Korean Peninsula.

4. Conclusion

The international regime of nuclear control, particularly that of IAEA, has been well rooted and implemented in South Korea. Even though there have been a few case of dispute for how to implement, South Korea has been in the position of 'Avant Garde' for the application of international regime of nuclear control.

The case of North Korea in connection with nuclear control is on the road to be a normal member. An important meaning of '2-13' is that North Korea could rebuild nuclear control regime of international community in association with its recovering efforts for political and economic crisis.

Two Koreas will restart to discuss the concrete way of implementation for denuclearized Peninsula. South Korea under the nuclear control regime of IS might go together with North Korea, which will be a member of IAEA under the regime of AP, if the '2-13' agreement attain its political and economic goals.

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