


Small modular reactor (SMR): A new design paradigm



<https://nucleus.iaea.org/sites/smr/SitePages/HomeSmrPlatform.aspx>

Small modular reactor (SMR): A new design paradigm

■ IAEA/NRC definition

- < 300MWe (< 1000MWt)
- One or more modules (**multi-modules**) can be operated with respect to diverse purposes.
- Load following, hydrogen generation, etc.

■ As of 2024, 68 SMRs are under development.

- Pressurized/Boiled water cooled SMRs
- High temperature gas cooled SMRs
- Molten salt cooled SMRs

Design	Output MW(e)	Type	Designers	Country	Status
WATER COOLED SMALL MODULAR REACTORS					
CAREM	30	PWR	CNEA	Argentina	Under construction
ACP100	125	PWR	CNNC	China	Under construction
NUWARD	2 × 170	PWR	EDF, CEA, TA, Naval Group	France	Conceptual design
SMART	107	PWR	KAERI and K.A.CARE	Republic of Korea	Standard design approval received
KLT-40S	2 × 35	PWR in floating NPP	JSC Afrikanov OKBM	Russian Federation	In operation
RITM-200N	2 × 53	PWR	JSC Afrikanov OKBM	Russian Federation	Detail design
UK SMR	443 ^a	PWR	Rolls-Royce and Partners	United Kingdom	Conceptual design
NuScale	6 × 77	PWR	NuScale Power Inc.	United States of America	Received US NRC certification
BWRX-300	270–290	BWR	GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy and Hitachi GE Nuclear Energy	United States of America and Japan, Canada	Pre-licensing
HIGH TEMPERATURE GAS COOLED SMALL MODULAR REACTORS					
HTR-PM	210	HTGR	INET, Tsinghua University	China	In operation
GTHTR300	100–300	HTGR	JAEA	Japan	Pre-licensing
Xe-100	82.5	HTGR	X-Energy LLC	United States of America	Basic design
FAST NEUTRON SPECTRUM SMALL MODULAR REACTORS					
EM ²	265	GMFR	General Atomics	United States of America	Conceptual design
MOLTEN SALT SMALL MODULAR REACTORS					
Integral MSR	195	MSR	Terrestrial Energy Inc.	Canada	Conceptual design
KP-FHR	140	Pebble bed salt cooled Reactor	KAIROS Power, LLC.	United States of America	Conceptual design
MICROREACTORS					
U-Battery	4	HTGR	Urenco	United Kingdom	Conceptual design
MMR	5–10	HTGR	Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation	United States of America, Canada	Conceptual design
Aurora	1.5	FR	OKLO, Inc.	United States of America	Conceptual design

Note: CNEA — National Atomic Energy Commission (of Argentina); CNNC — China National Nuclear Corporation; EDF — Électricité de France; CEA — French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission; KAERI — Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute; K.A.CARE — King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy, Saudi Arabia.

<https://nucleus.iaea.org/sites/smr/SitePages/HomeSmrPlatform.aspx>

Technical challenges of SMRs



Research needs recommended by OECD/NEA

■ Technology improvement

- Passive safety systems
- Digital I&C with automations
- Artificial intelligence (?)

■ New technology development

- Pebble-bed reactor of a high temperature gas cooled SMR



Research needs: Safe deployment of SMRs

Nuclear Safety
2023

CSNI Technical Opinion Paper No. 21

Table of contents

List of abbreviations and acronyms	9
Executive summary	11
Chapter 1. Introduction and background	15
Chapter 2. EGSMR assessment process	17
Chapter 3. Analysis of SMR deployment survey	19
3.1. Prerequisites – Technologies	19
3.2. Prerequisites – International co-operation	20
3.3. Knowledge base requirements for SMRs	21
3.4. Graded approach	21
Chapter 4. Areas of interest and suggested actions	23
4.1. AOI #1: Regulatory harmonisation	23
4.2. AOI #2: Cross-cutting safety issues	25
4.3. AOI #3: Experimental campaigns	28
4.4. AOI #4: Benchmarking for code V&V	31
4.5. Conclusion and key suggested actions	32
4.6. EGSMR information collection	33
Chapter 5. EGSMR future efforts	35
Conclusions	37
References	39

1. Application of defense in depth with **passive safety systems**/features
2. PSA for innovative/FOAK designs
3. Investigation of emergency planning zones (EPZs) and emergency response requirements for SMRs
4. **Fuel** safety of SMRs
5. **Human factors (e.g., remote operations and multi-unit/multi-module plants)**
6. **Multi-unit/multi-module** design aspects to determine the impacts on safety including shared systems, adjacent unit/module accidents and common mode failures
7. Safety and security aspects related to the transport of fueled nuclear modules and transportable/floating nuclear power plants
8. Interconnections between SMRs and **associated process applications** (e.g., hydrogen production and heat generation process)

Big jumps in Human Factors: Main control room design

Human Performance Issues in Analogue, Hybrid, and Digital Control Rooms, INL/EXT-15-37277, 2015

Human
performance
(reliability) is
important.

Manual operation with analog
I&C technologies for managing
a **single unit**




Digital I&C systems with a
high level automation to
manage **multi-modules**



<https://m.wowtv.co.kr/NewsCenter/News/Read?articleId=AKR20240628056800003>

Urgent issue: Collection of human performance data



Human performance?

Source of information

Operation experience (e.g., Framatome)

Full scope simulators

Laboratory experiments

Interview/subjective opinions from experts




NO for SMRs

Few simulators



Uncertainty

Alternative way to collect human performance data



Many organizations are planning/conducting experiments to explore the effect of human performance issues on a multi-module operation environment.

Human performance data collection: Worldwide status

■ IFE (Institute for Energy Tech.)

- Established SMR simulators in **2021** by integrating **6 iPWR** simulators
- A series of experiments have been conducted with US operators.
- Additional data collection campaign is undergoing.

■ INL (Idaho National Lab.)

- Human System Simulation Laboratory (**HSSL**) originally built in 2012 to support control room modernization
- New **HSSL-2** is being built (**2026**) for advanced reactors including SMRs.
- Human performance data will be collected for multi-module operations.



<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1738573322005174>

<https://ife.no/en/service/cutting-edge-smr-simulator-and-expert-services/>

_Cooperation with IFE, INL and NRC

- **Constructing a consortium with four organizations**
 - To share human performance data collected from each organization
 - Primary outputs will be published by white papers and technical reports
- **U.S. NRC**
 - Simulator studies toward understanding the impact of new technology (e.g., SMRs and microreactors)

Korea Atomic Energy Institute



Institute for Energy Technology



U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission



Idaho National Laboratory




A person wearing a dark suit and a light-colored shirt is holding a white rectangular sign with both hands. The sign is centered in the frame and contains the text "Status in Korea" in a bold, black, sans-serif font. The background is slightly blurred, showing the person's torso and hands.


Status in Korea

Human performance data collection: Korea (1/4)

- A large number of experiments to investigate the performance of human operators in the **iSMR operation environment**.
 - Four modules with 2 reactor operators (ROs) and one shift supervisor (SS)
 - Two modules per operator
 - Two display screens per module
- Experiment facility was developed by integrating four **CNSs** (Compact Nuclear Simulator)
 - Westinghouse 3-loop PWR
 - Partial-scope simulator for training
 - Emulating the primary, secondary, electrical systems and containment.



Human performance data collection: Korea (2/4)



Human performance data collection: Korea (3/4)

■ Experiment overview

- Performance measures
 - Error rate
 - Task completion time
 - Workload
 - Situation awareness
- Accidents/Transients
 - Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)
 - Excessive Steam Demand Event (ESDE)
- Number of trials
 - About **250 experiments** are expected.
- Subjects
 - Graduate/undergraduate **students**
 - Several **control room operators**


■ Expected timeline

- Preliminary experiment (Pilot test): July 2024
- Main experiment (Phase 1): August to December 2024
- Main experiment (**Phase 2**): January to June 2025
- Main experiment (Phase 3): June to October 2025
- Additional experiment (if needed): in 2026


Human performance data collection: Korea (4/4)

Controlled variable	Description	Condition
Number of off-normal modules per operator	Number of modules assigned to operator what are in off-normal conditions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 0.5 module/operator • 1.0 module/operator • 2.0 modules/operator
Homogeneity of off-normal conditions	Whether the operator should have different mental models or not. For instance, in case that accidents occurs in two modules controlled by one operator and the accidents are different, the operator should apply "different mental models" to each module for the mitigation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Different or Identical <i>(This condition only appears when 'Number of modules/operator' is 2.0.)</i>
Surveillance	Whether there is a supervisor who can monitor the operator's performance, and detect and recover errors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes or No
Passive system status indication	Whether there is any information with which the operator can recognize status of passive systems (e.g., alarm or indicators).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes or No
Automatic system status indication	Whether there is any information with which the operator can recognize status of automatic systems (e.g., alarm or indicators)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes or No


_Number of off-normal modules/operator



$$\frac{1 \text{ off-normal module}}{2 \text{ operators}} = 0.5$$




$$\frac{2 \text{ off-normal modules}}{2 \text{ operators}} = 1.0$$




$$\frac{4 \text{ off-normal modules}}{2 \text{ operators}} = 2.0$$



_Homogeneity of off-normal conditions





RO1: **Single** mental model for an off-normal condition



RO1/RO2: **Single** mental model for individual operator


RO1: **Homogeneous (similar)** mental model

RO2: **Different** mental models



_SS's surveillance

- SS needs to independently check the performance of an RO exposed to one more off-normal conditions.
 - Helpful for the RO
- The number of surveillance tasks loaded to SS will drastically increase in proportional to the number of off-normal conditions.
 - The support of the SS to an RO will not be possible in an extreme condition.



Q&A

